This paper develops a general equilibrium model of migration decisions to investigate the welfare and growth effect of immigration policy in host countries. A negative relationship is shown to exist between the domestic wage level and the percentage of educated workers among immigrants. Thus, the immigration quota should be set above a certain minimum level.to maximize national income. Extending the analysis to a dynamic setting, we highlight additional positive effects of the immigration quota on the average level of human capital and on economic growth.
Introduction
In recent years there has been a resurgence of international migration directed to industrialized countries, leading to increased incidence of the foreign-born in total population not only in "traditional" receiving countries (such as the Australia, Canada and the United States), but also in several European countries.
Rising migration pressures awaken public concern over the economic consequences of migration and the opportunity of introducing further restrictions to labor movements is often discussed. For example, in accordance with the controversial 2001 Law on Foreign Persons, the Spanish government established a quota for non-EU immigrants of 32,100 workers in 2003, notwithstanding a request of 90,000 persons by the employers' organizations. Recently, the EU interior Ministers agreed to consider a proposal by the Italian Presidency to introduce quota for legal immigrants from non-EU countries. Mediterranean EU countries along with Ireland and Austria, which already applies a quota system, are the most supportive of the idea. This paper studies the welfare and growth effects of quotas that regulate migration flows from the point of view of host countries. Departing from the existing theoretical literature, we endogenize the composition of immigrants inflow in a general equilibrium framework and shed light on how this composition is affected by the equilibrium wage prevailing on the domestic labor market and viceversa.
More specifically, we consider an economy where a single good is produced by means of an immobile factor (land) and an internationally mobile factor (labor). Unskilled and skilled foreign workers decide whether to apply for entry, taking into account migration costs, the wage gap, and the probability of finding a job reflecting their skills in the host economy. The immigration policy places a cap on the number of foreign workers who are allowed to enter.
Our main result is that the percentage of highly-educated immigrants increases with the total number of immigrants, which gives rise to a non-standard downward sloping labor supply. This highlights a novel reason why reducing rather than increasing restrictions on labor flows (e.g. increasing the immigration quota) may be beneficial from the point of view of destination countries and provides interesting policy implications regarding the optimal level of the immigration quota.
The crucial assumption behind this result is that, due to higher direct migration costs for the unskilled, the emigration rate is higher for skilled workers, given the wage gap. 1 This in turn determines a negative relationship between the percentage of skilled workers among immigrants and the domestic wage level. Thus, a low immigration quota (which avoids a sharp decrease in the domestic wage rate) has adverse effects on the number of skilled immigrants entering the economy and on natives' welfare.
This assumption is consistent with the human-capital migration model developed by Chiswick [5] , [6] who relates favorable selection of immigrants to smaller out-of-pocket costs for the skilled.
Recent empirical works seem to confirm the favorable selectivity hypothesis. Carrington and Detragiache [3] estimate the ratio of migrants to the US and other OECD countries to total population in sending countries by education achievement and find that "individuals with little or no education have little access to international migration, and migrants tend to be much better educated than the rest of the population of their country of origin".
Liebig and Susa-Poza [9] provide an empirical analysis of the determinants of desired immigration in OECD countries and conclude that "positive self-selection can be generally expected in international migration even in the presence of high income inequality in the country of origin". [4] show that Mexican immigrants to the US, though less educated on average than US natives, are positively selected in their home countries as they tend to have above-average education than Mexican residents notwithstanding the higher returns to education and wage dispersion prevailing in Mexico relative to the US. 2 1 For instance, skilled migrants may be able to clear migration procedures and to adapt to the new environment at lower costs as they are more efficient in collecting and processing information.
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2 These results are in contrast with the negative self-selection theory proposed by Borjas [2] , who predicts that, in the presence of higher wage inequality in the source country, emigrants will be chosen from the lower tail of the income distribution in the country of origin This approach assumes that there are no fixed
Extending the one-period model to an overlapping generations dynamic setup, we can derive some additional results. In particular, we will show that, if the immigration of highly-educated workers generates positive spillovers on natives' incentives to invest in education, there exists a threshold level of the immigration quota such that, for any quota above this threshold, the steady-state with immigration is characterized by a higher fraction of skilled natives than the closed economy. This brings about positive effects on the welfare of natives. Notice again that, differently from the existing literature of which we are aware on international labor flows and economic growth, we explicitly take into account the endogenous evolution of the average quality of immigrants and its relationship with immigration policy.
Beside the contributions to the literature that we already discussed, our work is related to other papers. Lundborg and Segerstrom [10] However, none of these contributions investigate the (self-selected) quality of immigrants which is instead taken as given.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the static model, characterizes the equilibrium with immigration, and discusses policy implications. Section
The one-period model
Consider an economy populated by N agents (households) where a fraction π of agents is educated while a fraction 1 − π is not.
Labor supply is inelastic and is higher in efficiency units for educated (skilled) agents than for uneducated (unskilled) agents. A non reproducible immobile factor available in fixed quantity (land) is used together with labor in the production of the final good.
Land property is equally distributed among all households. The final good and the labor markets are competitive.
In the final good sector, the non durable consumption good (Y ) is produced using land (T ) and labor (L), according to the following aggregate production function:
where T is the total supply of land. The total amount of labor in efficiency units L is
given by the sum of labor supply from skilled workers L s and unskilled workers L u , that is:
where ε s and ε u denote the fixed productivity of the skilled and the unskilled respectively, with ε s > ε u .
Aggregate supply of production factors (skilled labor, unskilled labor and land) is exogenously given. Aggregate demand reflects first order conditions for profit maximization and equilibrium factor prices are determined by:
where w u , w s and p represent the hourly wage for the unskilled and for the skilled and the (rental) price of land respectively and W is the wage per efficiency unit of labor.
Labor mobility
We now consider the possibility of international labor mobility and study its effects on aggregate income and natives' welfare.
In the international labor market there exists a very large (possibly infinite) number of workers. A fraction π * of these workers is educated (skilled) and has productivity equal to ε s * and a fraction (1 −π * ) is uneducated (unskilled) and has productivity equal to ε u * . We will denote with w s * and w u * the (exogenously given) international skilled and unskilled hourly wage, respectively. Notice that our formulation can encompass situations where the international skill premium ε s * /ε u * is higher or lower than the domestic skill premium
The immigration policy places a (enforceable) cap Q on the number of workers who are allowed to enter the country in each period. The actual number of immigrants will be denoted with M .
Migration is costly. First, agents face a subjective cost of migration θ ∈ [0, θ], independent of their skills. We will assume that θ is uniformly distributed and denote with G(θ) = θ/θ the cumulative distribution function. For each θ, there exist a very large (possibly infinite) number of agents whose subjective cost is equal to θ. Second, migration entails a fixed out-of-pocket cost which, as extensively discussed in the Introduction, we assume to be higher for the unskilled. We denote these costs with P u and P s respectively, with P u > P s .
Finally, due to transaction costs in the labor market of the receiving country, a fraction z of the educated immigrants is hired as unskilled workers. In this case their productivity reduces to ε u * . Uneducated agents are always hired as unskilled workers. 3 Thus, our model entails a self-selection bias against the skilled, since the positive probability of being hired 3 In the spirit of Katz and Stark [8] ,we could think that, with probability z, the education attainment of educated immigrants is not recognized by firms who hire them in the destination country, who thus pay them the unskilled foreign workers' hourly wage ε u * W . As higher productivity is not remunerated, educated agents provide lower effort and reduce their productivity in this case.The probability z may reflect institutional features of the domestic labor market as well as the existence of specific integration policies for immigrants.
as unskilled workers decreases their expected wage in the host country. Notice that this effect contrasts with the favorable selection induced by the higher migration costs for the unskilled.
Agents are risk-neutral and decide whether to apply for entry by comparing their total cost of migration with the expected difference between the labor income they can earn abroad and at home.
The equilibrium with immigration
As before, each agent earns a wage which is equal to W times her own productivity. So, for instance, a skilled worker employed in the domestic economy has a wage equal to W (L)ε s *
where L now includes domestic and foreign labor supply.
Skilled agents will be willing to migrate if and only if their subjective cost is lower than θ s , where:
Similarly, unskilled agents will be willing to migrate if and only if their subjective cost is lower than θ u , where:
Assuming that M is sufficiently large, the percentage of skilled agents in the total migrants' inflow is equal to the probability that an agent who is willing to migrate is skilled. We will denote this percentage with e π * and write:
Clearly, the percentage of unskilled agents in the total migrants' inflow is equal to 1 − e π * .
The labor supply with immigration
In order to characterize the competitive equilibrium with migration, we need to study the behavior of labor supply when immigrants are allowed to enter the domestic labor market.
This will require some additional definitions.
First of all, let us define a threshold value of the unit wage W below which no skilled agent is willing to migrate. This threshold value is the one that makes foreign skilled agents with the lowest subjective cost of migration just indifferent between migrating or not and is given by:
Similarly, a threshold value can be defined for the unskilled, that is:
Second, we can define a threshold value such that all the skilled are willing to migrate.
This value is given by:
Similarly, for the unskilled, we have:
Coherently with the empirical evidence we have discussed in the Introduction, we will focus on the case where W 0 u > W 0 s which implies θ s > θ u zε u * +(1−z)ε s * ε u * so that the migration rate is higher among skilled agents than among the unskilled. 4 We are now ready to characterize the labor supply locus and prove the following result:
Proposition 1 Labor supply decreases with W for W ∈ (W 0 u , W 00 u ) and is inelastic elsewhere.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Q denote the national and foreign component of labor supply respectively.
s , at least for some W we have θ s < θ u so that the migration rate is higher for the unskilled.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
The intuition for the non-standard shape of labor supply is the following. At high levels of the wage, all foreign agents are willing to migrate and the proportion of skilled immigrants is exogenously given by π * . In this case, given Q, the foreign contribution to labor supply is minimum and total labor supply is inelastic. At low levels of the wage, only skilled immigrants find it profitable to enter the domestic labor market and the proportion of skilled immigrants is equal to 1. Foreign contribution is maximum and labor supply is again inelastic. For intermediate levels between W 0 u and W 00 u , the percentage of skilled immigrants in the total inflow is decreasing with the wage and so is labor supply. This result is crucially dependent on the assumption of a higher migration rate for the skilled, due to higher costs of mobility for the unskilled.
Having discussed the properties of labor supply, we are ready to characterize the equilibrium with immigration. The formal statement will require an additional definition.
Thus, let us define the maximum inflow of immigrants compatible with the labor market equilibrium as 5 :
Then, we can write:
Proposition 2 In a competitive equilibrium with immigration, either: e π * = 1.
As the proposition shows, there are two possible types of equilibrium. In the former, the immigration quota is binding and labor market clears with Q foreign workers, of which a fraction e π * ∈ [π * , 1] is skilled. At this equilibrium W > W 0 s . In the latter, the immigration quota is high (and possibly not binding) and the labor market clears with the maximum number of immigrants M . The unit wage rate is at the minimum level W 0 s compatible with immigration and only skilled workers enter the domestic economy. 6 
Policy implications
In our context, it is interesting to consider what would be the optimal immigration policy for a government whose objective were to maximize the income (and consequently the welfare) of domestic citizens.
To discuss this issue, let us assume that a given quota Q is currently in place. If the government restricts immigration further, by setting Q 0 < Q, it would increase the level of domestic wages, both for the skilled and the unskilled. However, it would also bring about a decrease in the percentage of skilled workers among immigrants. Thus, total labor supply decreases and so does aggregate income and consumption. Therefore, we can state the following result:
Proposition 3 National income is maximized if and only if Q ≥ M.
Proof. National income can be written as:
Note that NI is increasing with L * and the latter is maximized when Q ≥ M .
Clearly, the maximization of national income entails possible redistributive conflicts as long as for domestic agents labor income is reduced while land income is increased. If 6 A non-increasing labor supply implies that the equilibrium wage may not be unique. A sufficient condition for uniqueness is that labor supply is steeper than labor demand between W 0 u and W 00 u . We restrict the analysis to this case as the presence of multiple equilibria would not change the main qualitative results of the model. land were unequally distributed, the immigration policy that we have just described may not be Pareto improving.
The dynamic model
Skilled workers migration is likely to determine positive long-run effects in the receiving economy, for instance by stimulating knowledge accumulation 7 or by contributing to human capital formation. The overall growth effect of immigration could be negative, however, if immigrants are less educated than natives on average. 8 This may happen because the foreign educational attainment is low relative to the domestic level ( ε s * < ε s , ε u * < ε u ) and/or because the percentage of unskilled agents is higher among immigrants than among natives (e π * < π). In presence of negative growth effects, the impact of immigration on natives welfare may also be negative.
As we have seen in the previous section, when migration entails larger direct costs for the unskilled, the selection of immigrants will be more favorable the larger the inflow of immigrants. The level of the immigration quota may therefore play an important role in determining the long-run effects of immigration.
To explore this issue, in this section we study a dynamic extension of our model, where the distribution of skills among the native labor force π t is determined by previous private education decisions.
7 See Lundborg and Segerstrom [10] . 8 Most growth models with immigration (see e.g. chapter 9 in Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1] ) assume that the human capital of immigrants is low on average relative to natives. This assumption is mainly motivated by the US experience, as the percentage of individuals with low education attainment is much higher among immigrants into the US than among natives. However, this is not the case in other major destination countries, such as Canada for example. Moreover, immigrants are generally more concentrated than natives at very high levels of education attainment. This is also true in the US, as reported by Hanson et alia [7] .
The closed economy case
We first set up the dynamic model in the closed economy case (Q = 0) and then consider the possibility of international migration (Q > 0).
We consider an OLG framework with a constant mass N of households, each composed by a grand-parent (old retiree), a parent (adult worker) and a child. All agents are born with some level of innate ability a i which determines their aptitude to learn and is stochastically generated by a random process. We assume that there is no correlation between a parent's and his offspring's ability and between the latter and the parent's skill (education) level, that is the random variable a i is identically and independently distributed over the interval [a, a] in each generation and class. The distribution function of ability is uniform.
Children who attend school become high-productivity workers in adulthood. Children who do not attend school become low-productivity workers in adulthood. The individual cost of acquiring education is denoted with e i t and is proportional to the skilled hourly wage w s t by a factor 0 < µ i t < 1 which depends inversely on the child's innate ability a i and on a measure of the average level of human capital λ t . 9 In particular, we assume:
where b > 0 and:
To ensure 0 < µ i t < 1 we impose 0 < a and a < 1 + b. We assume that there are no capital markets, so that altruistic parents allocate wage income I t (which depends on skill level) between consumption (including that of their children) and education expenditure, by deciding whether or not to send their children to school. 9 Alternatively, we could have introduced the intergenerational externality in the process of human capital accumulation by assuming that the skill premium is positively affected by the average level of human capital in the previous period ("children stand on the shoulder of their parents"). This would not change the main results of our analysis.
Land belongs to the old, who use rental income to finance consumption. In the absence of voluntary transfers, land property is passed from one generation to the next in the form of (involuntary) bequest.
The utility function of an agent born at time t − 1 takes the form:
where α, β, γ ∈ (0, 1), c t denotes adult-age consumption and d t+1 denotes old-age consumption. Altruism takes a "warm glow" form, such that parents positively value their children's income in adulthood I t+1 .
The budget constraints faced by this agent are:
Schooling decisions and the dynamics of natives' human capital
The only economic decision that household members need to take is for adults to decide whether or not to send their children to school. Such decision is taken by parents after observing children's ability.
At time t, a skilled worker will send her child to school if and only she has a level of ability at least equal to a s t = a s (π t ) ∈ (a, a), where a s (π t ) is defined by:
Similarly, an unskilled worker will send her child to school if and only if she has a level of ability at least equal to a u t = a u (π t ) ∈ (a, a), where a u (π t ), is defined by:
By observation of equations (19) and (20) and taking into account that 0 < µ i t < 1 we can conclude that a s t < a u t ∀t. 10
10 To ensure interior solutions for a s t and a u t , we will assume that −α ln(a + bε s ) < γ ln(ε s /ε u ) and
At time t, a fraction 1 − F [a s (π t )] of the children born from skilled parents and a fraction 1 − F [a u (π t )] of the children born from unskilled parents are sent to school. In equilibrium, the proportion of skilled workers at time t + 1 is thus given by:
which simplifies to:
where
We are now ready to establish the following result:
Proposition 4 In the closed economy, the fraction of skilled native workers π t converges to a globally stable steady state π c defined by:
In the absence of immigration, the economy converges to a steady state characterized by a constant fraction of skilled native workers π c and constant labor supply L c .
The dynamics with immigration
We now extend the analysis to investigate the dynamic effects of immigration. For simplicity, we restrict attention to temporary migration. In particular, we assume that, in each period, a mass M t ≤ Q of adult workers is admitted into the country. Immigrants are required to return home at the end of the period.
Even if temporary, immigration may have relevant long run effects in our model. In fact, if the average human capital of immigrants is high relative to natives, then immigration of relatively skilled individuals will reduce the individual cost of education and stimulate human capital formation among natives, by reducing the threshold levels of ability that make schooling the preferred option. On the contrary, if the average human capital of immigrants is low relative to natives, immigration will reduce domestic average human capital with negative spillover effects on individual incentives for human capital accumulation.
In each period, given the fraction of skilled natives π t (predetermined at time t), the domestic average level of human capital λ t depends on the number of immigrants M t and their selection e π * t . In particular, we have:
As in the static case, e π * t and M t are determined in equilibrium along with the unit wage W t = W (L t ). The immigration quota Q will be binding whenever it is lower than the maximum inflow of immigrants compatible with equilibrium on the labor market M t .
The dynamics of natives human capital with international migration is then determined by equation (21). Notice that dΠ/dπ t = Γ + b(dλ t /dπ t ) is certainly positive for Q < M t . 11 Let us now consider the dynamic effects of a liberalization of labor flows (setting Q > 0). We will denote with T the time of liberalization and assume that at T the economy starts from the closed economy steady-state position (that is, π T = π c ).
At the opening of borders, domestic labor supply increases (L T > L c ), due to the inflow of immigrants, and the unit wage jumps down (W T < W c ). Domestic average human capital λ T will decrease (increase) relative to the closed economy steady-state level λ c if and only if the average human capital of immigrants is low (high) relative to natives, that is if and only if:
The dynamic evolution of the economy after T depends crucially on the equilibrium value of e π * T , which is determined by the level of the quota Q, given π c . To state our main result regarding the dynamics of the model with immigration, we need one additional definition. Thus, let us define the wage level which is required for λ T = λ c as follows:
. 12 We can then write the following:
, the fraction of skilled natives converges to a steady-state level which is higher than the steady-state level in the closed economy.
Proof. See Appendix B.
With international migration there are two possible steady states. In the first one, the steady-state fraction of skilled natives is lower than in the closed economy. The path toward the long-run equilibrium is characterized by decreasing π t and e π * t . The wage rate jumps down at the time of liberalization of labor flows and increases in each subsequent period. The overall effect on the steady-state level of unit wage is ambiguous. On the one hand, the decrease in the fraction of skilled natives shifts labor supply to the left and consequently increase the wage rate relative to the closed economy. On the other hand, independently from their skills, the entry of foreign workers shifts labor supply to the right, thereby pushing the wage rate up.
In the second equilibrium, the steady-state fraction of skilled natives is higher than in the closed economy. The path toward this equilibrium is characterized by increasing π t and e π * t . The wage rate jumps down at the time of liberalization of labor flows and decreases in each subsequent period. The steady-state unit wage is lower than in the closed economy. Whether the economy ends up in the first or in the second type of equilibrium depends on the level of the immigration quota which in turn affects the average human capital λ right after the opening of borders.
When the quota is low, the wage rate after liberalization is high and the quality of immigrants is low. Thus, the initial effect on λ will be negative, the next period proportion of skilled national workers will be lower and the wage rate higher, further reducing the proportion of skilled immigrants. In turn this will decrease λ and so on. If the quota is sufficiently high, the effect on λ is positive, the opposite will happen and the equilibrium will be of the second type.
Policy implications
As we know, immigration increases welfare in the short run, as labor supply and national income increase due to the initial inflow of immigrants. However, if the immigration policy is too restrictive, human capital accumulation is reduced in the host country. The implied reduction in labor supply by natives may outweigh the positive effect of immigration on aggregate labor supply with negative long-run effects on the welfare of natives.
More specifically, when Q <
and the wage rate reaches a level higher than W c , immigration lowers national income in the long-run. In this case, the steady-state equilibrium of the closed economy is Pareto superior (given an appropriate redistribution) relative to the equilibrium with immigration.
However, as the last proposition suggests, the trade-off between short-run and long-run 
Conclusions
In this work we have provided a formal investigation of the economic consequences of international migration from the point of view of destination countries, assuming that migration costs are higher for the less-educated. Consistently with international evidence on migration flows, this implies that the migration rate is higher among the highly-educated.
Extending the human capital migration model to a general equilibrium setting, we have shown that there exists a negative relationship between the equilibrium level of domestic wage and the percentage of educated workers among immigrants. This yields interesting policy implications regarding the effects of quantitative restrictions on immigration on natives' welfare and human capital accumulation.
In particular, the optimal immigration policy from the point of view of natives requires an immigration quota above a certain minimum level. This policy drives down the domestic wage and results in high labor demand and positive selection of immigrants. In turn, this determines a substantial brain gain through the inflow of highly-educated individuals with positive consequences on national income and welfare and significant dynamic effects in terms of higher human capital accumulation among natives.
Our analysis may be extended along several dimensions. On the one hand, dropping perfect substitutability of skilled and unskilled labor in production, we may study the influence of migration on the skill premium and on the return to investment in education.
Another fruitful extension may explore the political economy of migration in a dynamic perspective. We leave these extensions for future research. market at T + 1, given Q, we must have W T +1 ≤ W T ⇒ e π * T +1 ≥ e π * T . Then, λ T +1 ≥ λ T ⇒ π T +2 ≥ π T +1 and so on. As we assumed that dΠ/dπ t > 0 even when Q ≥ M t , we can conclude that the economy converges to a π ≥ π c and e π * ∈ [π * T , 1). 
